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In her observations of the emergent trend in Africa to produce blueprints of 
futuristic cities, Vanessa Watson (2014: 215) examines how African governments 
are keen to work with international investors to turn existing urban centers or 
peripheries into “gateways for international investors and showpieces for ambi-
tious politicians”. The efforts of the African cities can also be witnessed in other 
parts of the world— for example, in Southeast Asia, where governments have 
engaged in megaprojects to build brand new urban centers in peri- urban areas 
(see, e.g., Percival and Waley, 2012). One of the reasons behind this is the urgent 
need to address extant urban problems in the context of global competition for 
footloose capital while ensuring the legitimacy of incumbent political elites. In 
this global endeavor, Asian urbanism has emerged as a source of inspiration (Roy 
and Ong, 2011).
In this regard, South Korea (hereafter Korea) provides an interesting point 
of reference for cities elsewhere in the Global South. Cities in Korea are often 
depicted as vertical cities with endless clusters of high- rise condominiums and 
office buildings, supported by the seamless connectivities and mobilities of data, 
people and commodities. For onlookers, Korea’s experience in transforming its 
urban- scape “from hovels to highrises” (cf. Power, 1993) may be received with 
a sense of wonder, an urban manifestation of Korea’s “economic miracle” that 
has become a source of developmental aspiration. The Korean version of Asian 
urbanism, be it real or imagined (Shin, 2019), has been increasingly utilized 
by the Korean state and its agencies— such as the Korea Land and Housing 
Corporation— as an export to other countries in the Global South (see Jung, 
2019; Kim, 2018; Lee, 2015; van Noorloos and Leung, 2017).
However, there is a danger of idealizing the developmental achievements 
of Korea when specific policies and projects are isolated from the sociopolitical 
relations that gave rise to them. In this regard, this chapter aims to highlight the 
importance of situating this developmental experience within Korea’s broader 
sociopolitical relations while avoiding the risk of falling into “methodological 
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nationalism” (see Choi, 2014; Doucette and Park, 2019).1 Lessons to be 
learned will have to involve a careful analysis of how Korea’s urban development 
experience— which has relied heavily on accumulating property assets— came 
about and what this experience means for social equity and justice from a critical 
perspective.
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. First, it will discuss the 
post- war challenges and some of the noteworthy urban development experiments 
before the 1980s, when the country was prioritizing industrialization over the 
adequate provision of housing. Second, the salient characteristics of property- 
based urban development from the 1980s onward will be examined, focusing 
on (1) the speculative nature of urban development, (2) rent gap and develop-
ment gains, (3)  vertical accumulation, and (4) displacement and dispossession 
of extant land users. Third, the role of the state will be analyzed, examining the 
extent to which the state endeavored to establish property as hegemonic. The 
final section will summarize the discussions and present lessons for urban devel-
opment “Korean style” for other countries in the Global South.
Pre- 1980s urban development: post- war challenges and 
experiments
The reality of urban development in Korea before the 1980s was that the private 
sector was weak— albeit on the path to realizing an economy of scale— and the 
level of housing investment stayed relatively low despite government emphasis on 
increased production. According to a report from the Korea Research Institute 
for Human Settlements (1981: 13– 14), the share of housing investment in gross 
national product averaged 1.6 percent between 1962 and 1966 and below 3 per-
cent between 1967 and 1971. In the 1960s, the housing supply in Korea was 
dominated by small- scale private builders who produced nearly 90  percent of 
new housing (Korea National Housing Corporation, 2001:  232). The Korea 
National Housing Corporation (hereafter KNHC), a public housing agency, was 
established in 1962 to build homes for low- income families nationwide; how-
ever, its contribution remained minimal during the early years (ibid.). The cen-
tral government’s attempts to increase housing production were often overly 
ambitious and its projections underachieved. For instance, the second five- year 
economic development program (1967– 1971) aimed at the construction of 
800,000 dwelling units, which was roughly equal to one- fifth of the total number 
of existing dwellings in 1965 (Ministry of Construction and Transportation of 
Korea, 2002: 27; Planning and Coordination for the Cabinet Office, 1967: 397). 
Once put into the implementation stage, the plan was substantially scaled down 
to aim for 500,000 units in order to save the government from humiliation 
(Ministry of Construction and Transportation of Korea, 2002: 27).
One of the key urban problems was sprawling illegal dwellings of poor quality. 
During the years of recovery after the Korean War (1950– 1953), illegal and sub-
standard dwellings sprung up in large numbers on available land in urban areas. 
This phenomenon was particularly acute in Seoul, Korea’s capital. The Seoul 
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Municipal Government largely regarded these dwellings as “cancerous elements” 
that deterred “continuous implementation of capital building” (Seoul Municipal 
Government, 1970: 263) or as undesirable features that “damaged urban land-
scape” (Seoul Municipal Government, 1973: 4). Policy responses in the 1950s 
and 1960s were mostly focused on containing their growth and demolishing 
existing illegal, poor quality dwellings. A report stated that, between 1958 and 
1972, the municipal government managed to relocate approximately 0.3 million 
residents from 48,718 dwellings to the city outskirts (Jeong, 1984, cited in Jang, 
1998:  27). Disciplinary measures were announced occasionally to discourage 
additional construction of such dwellings. For instance, right after the military 
coup in 1961, the owners of illegal dwellings subject to demolition were to be 
put on trial in a military court (see Kim et al., 1996: 74). However, clearing all 
the substandard neighborhoods with illegal dwellings posed various constraints 
and faced resistance, and many of them managed to survive.
In light of the difficulties in dealing with mushrooming illegal dwellings in 
Seoul, the municipal government made a proposal to the central government 
for the enactment of a special law enabling the municipal government to take 
more systematic measures to eradicate illegal dwellings and settlements. The 
Temporary Act on the Promotion of Housing Improvement (hereafter the 
Temporary Act) was thus enacted in 1973. It aimed at completing the “improve-
ment” of all illegal and substandard dwellings by 1981, which was the year the 
Temporary Act was due to expire. The key to achieving this goal was to allow 
the free transfer of ownership of those public lands occupied by squatter dwellers 
from the central government to the municipal government. In this way, when 
an illegal settlement on such public land became subject to renewal, land sale 
revenues could be retained by the municipality, providing it with the financial 
resources to proceed with the subsequent renewal of other settlements (Kim 
et al., 1996: 85). The ideas behind the Temporary Act can be seen in the admin-
istrative statement by the Seoul Municipal Government below (Seoul Municipal 
Government, 1974: 331):
What is urgent in reality is to tackle the illegal, substandard dwellings that 
exist in disorder in great numbers all around the city … these dwellings 
impoverish mountains and fields; cause inundation of rivers and flooding of 
urban districts; make citizens sick due to the pollution from contamination; 
cause low self- esteem that produce social problems as there are no benefits of 
having cultural facilities; and degrade the façade of Seoul. [Therefore,] it is 
inevitable to improve these illegal dwellings and put them in order.
The Temporary Act ultimately targeted approximately 121,000 dwellings 
in 230 project areas in Seoul, which accounted for about three- quarters of 
the 155,467 illegal dwellings identified in December 1973 (Seoul Municipal 
Government, 1974: 345– 346). Any units excluded from this renewal measure 
were subject to demolition (Kim et al., 1996: 86). The main renewal method 
adopted was self- help renewal by means of either “in situ upgrading” or “clearance 
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and redevelopment”, depending on site conditions. The “in situ upgrading” 
scheme was not popular due to the financial burden, as it depended on owner- 
occupiers taking the initiative and paying for the expenses of upgrading their 
dwellings to the standard prescribed by the Building Act (Kim et al., 1996; Lee, 
2000). The lack of meaningful progress was the same for the “clearance and 
redevelopment” scheme. However, this scheme is noteworthy for its laying out 
of the basic principles that the more commercially oriented urban redevelop-
ment scheme from the 1980s (known as the Joint Redevelopment Program, or 
Hapdong Jaegaebal in Korean) was founded upon.2
The efforts by the Korean state to clear shanty settlements were structurally 
constrained as well. While the rebirth of the city center was essential for the 
authoritarian developmental state to demonstrate its power (e.g., the clearance 
of substandard dwellings along the Cheonggye Stream), substandard settlements 
located away from the new central business district survived the clearance efforts 
of the government, serving the function of providing affordable housing for the 
urban poor and keeping their labor costs low (Mobrand, 2008; see also Kim, 
2010). Maintaining such living conditions for labor also met the interests of both 
the state and nascent capitalists because the state concentrated available resources 
on nurturing the growth of capital (especially the emergent conglomerates known 
as chaebol) that depended heavily on low wages and a large pool of surplus labor 
(Park, 1998).
The relatively weak emphasis on housing investment is reflected in macro- 
economic statistics as well. When the Korean economy began to take off in the 
1970s, gross investment in fixed capital formation expanded sharply to support 
Korea’s industrialization. The value of gross fixed capital formation as a share of 
gross domestic product (hereafter GDP) at 2000 constant prices increased from 
14.9 percent in 1970 to 26.1 percent in 1985, hitting a ceiling of 39.3 percent 
in 1996 (The Bank of Korea, 2004). The absolute amount of housing invest-
ment increased in line with the expansion of investment in fixed capital; how-
ever, the share of housing investment in real GDP hardly exceeded the 5 percent 
threshold level between 1970 and 1985 (ibid.). In other words, housing invest-
ment received less emphasis in comparison with other investments in facilities and 
non- residential construction in times of rapid economic development.
Post- 1980s property- based urban development
The urban policy of the Korean developmental state took a major turn in the 
1980s, building upon the lessons from the previous era. The state proceeded 
with mass housing provision based on “bricks and mortar” subsidies to private 
builders; they also stipulated various laws to support the intervention by state 
agencies and property owners in land and housing development. The central 
government led by the December 1979 coup leader made a bold announcement 
in August 1980 that it would construct 5 million dwellings during the next ten 
years (Dong’a Ilbo, 1980; see also Son, 2000). Pursuit of this goal may have 
appeared quite mad, as it more or less equated with the total number of housing 
62 Hyun Bang Shin
stocks nationwide in 1980 and twice the total number of urban housing stocks 
(Economic Planning Board of Korea, 1982). The Korean state managed to boost 
housing production substantially throughout the 1980s by supporting private 
builders, many of which were subsidiaries of conglomerates, to increase their 
outputs. The total number of dwellings constructed between 1982 and 1992 
reached about 4.1 million units (Korea National Housing Corporation, 2004; 
Ministry of Construction and Transportation of Korea, 2002). Between 1988 
and 1992, 2.7 million of these units were produced (ibid.), assisted by another 
big push from the central government, which was led by the successor of the 
aforementioned coup leader.
The enactment of the Housing Site Development Promotion Act in 1980 
also enabled the use of state agencies such as the Korea Land Corporation to 
develop land in urban peripheries and rural areas that could then be used for 
mass housing construction by builders (see the chapter in this volume by Im 
Seowhan). In Seoul, where the most crowded living conditions were amplified 
by the large presence of substandard settlements, urban redevelopment projects 
were launched to replace such settlements with high- density apartment complexes 
(Kim, 2010). In contrast, the strengthening of social welfare received much less 
attention throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It was only from the late 1990s, after 
the Asian financial crisis, that the Korean developmental state began to embark 
on initiatives to put together programs to build social safety nets and expand 
social housing programs (Song, 2009). Urban development in Korea from the 
1980s can be summed up as property- based development that aimed at the phys-
ical improvement of the built environment for profitable gains. It exhibited the 
following key characteristics.
Speculative urbanization
The construction of an urbanizing society in Korea was initially led by the eco-
nomic motifs of the Korean developmental state, which prioritized economic 
growth and industrialization. After a brief moment of import substitution, 
the authoritarian developmental state led by the military dictatorship pursued 
an export- oriented economy, investing in the formation of industrial clusters 
(Castells, 1992). A number of select small towns and cities across the country, 
such as Ulsan, Changwon, and Gumi, emerged as sites of concentrated invest-
ment to develop and expand manufacturing capacity, working in multi- scalar 
processes that brought together state actors as well as those in localities (e.g., 
on Changwon, see Choi, 2014). Infrastructural development as productive 
investment to support the growth of these industrial clusters also took place, 
rapidly giving rise to the accumulation of fixed assets (Harvey, 1978). In this 
regard, the 1960s and 1970s can be considered as a period of industrialization 
leading to urbanization (Shin, 2018). The opening of Korea’s first expressway— 
the Gyeongbu Expressway— to connect the southern port city of Busan with 
Seoul might be one of the best demonstrations of such fixed asset accumulation 
coordinated by the developmental state (Choi, 2010).
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However, the 1980s onward saw the rising importance of speculative urban-
ization that built on the growth and commodification of land and housing devel-
opment (La Grange and Jung, 2004; Shin, 2009) as the main locus of wealth 
accumulation by real estate businesses as well as urbanites, especially the upper- 
class and emergent middle- class families. One of the key strategies pursued in this 
regard was the promotion of large- scale residential estates called danji, which 
allowed cost- efficient infrastructure provision and the standardization of condo-
minium construction. Initially applied to the massive housing site development in 
the south of the Han River, the concept was developed to facilitate the ten- year 
(1972– 1981) housing construction program (Planning and Coordination for the 
Cabinet Office, 1972: 253– 254) and was subsequently supported by the afore-
mentioned Housing Site Development Promotion Act. One of the most well- 
known danji was the Mokdong danji, which accommodated about 27,000 units, 
geared largely towards emergent middle- class families (Shin and Kim, 2016: 545; 
see also Lett, 1998:  115– 117; Son, 2000). The danji model has become the 
norm for new town programs as well as commercialized inner- city redevelopment 
programs, both of which were embarked upon from the 1980s.
The Korean developmental state in the late 1980s embarked on the construc-
tion of new residential towns; this was in sharp contrast to its practice of building 
new industrial towns throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The five new towns 
constructed between 1989 and 1996 included Bundang, Ilsan, Pyeongchon, 
Sanbon and Jungdong, all located on the peripheries of Seoul and thereby serving 
as “bed towns” for middle- class families whose breadwinners largely commuted to 
Seoul (La Grange and Jung, 2004). The Housing Site Development Promotion 
Act was instrumental in the construction of these new towns, with the Korea 
Land Corporation acing as developer of all new towns except Jungdong, which 
involved the KNHC and Bucheon Municipal Government as the other two 
developers. Development gains were anticipated by the Korea Land Corporation, 
which sold assembled land to private builders, who subsequently constructed 
commercial condominiums for profit. Through the Housing Site Development 
Promotion Act, the Korean developmental state was able to fast- track planning 
and construction processes.
Speculation was a frequent source of concern in the housing market. 
Condominiums were particularly attractive to the emergent middle class from 
the late 1970s (Gelézeau, 2007; Yang, 2018). Middle- class buyers rushed in and 
snatched up condominium units supplied in large numbers in the south of the Han 
River in Seoul, commonly referred to as Gangnam. Living in an apartment com-
plex came to be regarded as a key status symbol, as Lett (1998: 110) notes: “The 
stereotypic image of South Korea’s contemporary middle class included not only 
residence in Kangnam [Gangnam] south of the Han River but also life in a high- 
rise apartment complex”. Various reports suggest that new condominium units 
in new apartment complexes (danji) became the object of intense competition 
among buyers. For instance, in 1977, 19,800 applications were reported to have 
been made for 160 new units put up for sale, creating rampant speculative fervor 
among buyers (see Mobrand, 2008: 381– 382).
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Condominiums produced as a result of commercial urban redevelopment were 
particularly attractive to middle- class speculative buyers because these units were 
supplied at production cost for the original property owners with little profits 
imposed by developers (Ha, 2001). Typically, financially weak property owners 
sold their rights to these newly redeveloped condominium units to speculative 
buyers, while developers enjoyed profits from selling excess redeveloped units 
supplied through high- density development (Shin, 2009). Such units supplied 
at production cost caused a large price increase in the market, allowing buyers to 
reap their own returns on speculative investments.
Rent gap and development gains
As Harvey notes, “land is not a commodity in the ordinary sense. It is a ficti-
tious form of capital that derives from expectations of future rents” (2012: 28). 
When a piece of land gets (re)developed, the completion of development can be 
equated with the closure of the rent gap between capitalized (“actually realised”) 
land rent based on the extant use of the land and potential land rent that is 
expected when the land is put to “the highest and best use” (Clark, 1988; Smith, 
1979). A number of factors contribute to the rise of a rent gap. It can be created 
“by continued urban development and expansion … that has historically raised 
the potential ground rent level in the inner city” (Smith, 1996: 67– 68)— though 
there is no reason to assume that this would happen only to inner- city areas 
(see Lees, Shin and López- Morales, 2016). In a country such as Korea that 
has experienced condensed urbanization and heavy investment in fixed assets, 
including infrastructure (Shin, 2019), the potential land rent in underdeveloped 
land in urban peripheries or former agricultural areas would experience a rapid 
increase, raising expectations for ample development gains when such land is 
designated for (re)development. This process of rent gap closure through (re)
development would underlie the state- led development of new housing sites as 
per the Housing Site Development Promotion Act.
The urban redevelopment of substandard settlements in Seoul is an example of 
how the rent gap drives commercial property- based development. Here, the rent 
gap may have grown by a number of factors, some of which I will outline here. 
First, as noted above, city- wide development in Seoul places development pressure 
on existing substandard settlements in order to put the land to “the highest 
and best use”, such as condominium estates for more affluent families or office 
buildings for businesses. Second, rent gaps may also be enlarged by changes to 
the planning regulations that affect substandard settlements. For instance, higher 
building density permitted to a parcel of development land would increase the 
potential land rent. Changing the land use designation into something that allows 
for more profitable development (e.g., agricultural use converted to urban resi-
dential use) would also create a larger rent gap and thereby greater development 
pressure. Third, as property owners in substandard settlements usually face a lack 
of de jure property rights due to the illegal status of their properties standing on 
public land,3 property owners and particularly absentee landlords would have less 
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incentive to make substantial reinvestment in their properties; this would lead to 
the devaluation of their properties and subsequently lower capitalized land rent. 
Furthermore, if a neighborhood is designated as a redevelopment district, add-
itional structural extension or modification of the dwellings would be prohibited 
in accordance with the Urban Planning Act until the commencement of redevel-
opment (Ministry of Construction and Transportation of Korea, 2000: 40– 41).4 
This would force property owners to “keep the building appropriate to its site, 
or, withhold investment, minimize maintenance and variable costs, and milk it as 
it stands, resulting in a broadening of the rent gap” (Clark, 1988: 252); it would 
also discourage inward investment even more, thereby keeping the capitalized 
land rent at low levels and enlarging the rent gap.
If we take the increase in land price as a proxy to understand the extent of 
rent gap closure, redevelopment of dilapidated neighborhoods should result 
in ample profiteering opportunities, especially when much of the land in such 
neighborhoods is not privately owned. According to a report from the Seoul 
Municipal Government in 1998, about 40 percent of the land in redevelopment 
project neighborhoods in Seoul was in public ownership, while 57 percent of 
dwellings were without land titles and thus illegal (Seoul Municipal Government, 
1998: 20– 21, cited in Shin, 2009: 908). As the high share of public land and 
illegal dwellings commanded lower land prices, redevelopment projects aimed 
at privatizing public land and commercial high- density developments led to the 
surge of (official) land prices. For example, in Sanggye 4- 1 District— which was 
located in northeastern Seoul and was one of the first redevelopment project sites 
completed just before the 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games— the purchase 
price of public land was KRW 90,750 per square meter, which was only half the 
price of the private land in the adjacent neighborhood (Jang, 1998: 58– 59).
Nevertheless, when news of (re)development spreads, there is a growing 
expectation that development gains can be made, attracting speculative interests 
who would exploit the opportunity by, for example, purchasing extant proper-
ties at higher prices to win the right to become a member of the redevelopment 
association, entitling them to purchase a redeveloped unit at a discounted price. 
Such speculative activities lead to the rise of capitalized land rent. As Clark notes, 
“[c] apitalized land rent rises rapidly, and the rent gap narrows rapidly, towards 
the end of the cycle when the property becomes an object of speculation with a 
view towards redevelopment” (1988: 252). Korea has seen many such speculative 
interests in the process of promoting urban redevelopment as well as housing site 
development.
Furthermore, the profit- oriented nature of urban redevelopment can also be 
seen in the way project financing hinges on maximizing the production of com-
mercial units for sale. This is because the size of profits for redevelopment asso-
ciations are determined by the number of new units sold in the new housing 
market.5 According to data released by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport,6 there were, in total, 547 redevelopment districts designated between 
1972 and 2004 in Korea, which were to produce nearly 300,000 new flats. Of 
these, only 6.4  percent were allocated to the members of the redevelopment 
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association that led the redevelopment, while 77.7 percent were produced for sale 
in the new housing market (see Table 4.1).
“Vertical accumulation” and the vertical city
Maximizing development gains and returns on investment can be aided by 
building densification as a key planning tool. One way to judge the degree of 
densification is to examine the floor- area ratio (hereafter FAR), which is the ratio 
of a building’s gross floor space to the net area of the ground where the building 
stands. FAR has been an effective planning tool for the government in propelling 
or restraining real estate development: A high FAR would incentivize real estate 
investors, as a larger building volume for sale can be provided on the planned site, 
whereas a low FAR would have the opposite effect. The case of urban redevelop-
ment summarized in Table 4.1 also illustrates the importance of density for com-
mercial gains. Between 2005 and 2017, the average share of redeveloped flats for 
sale in the new housing market decreased to 44.5 percent, which translated to 
lower profitability than in previous years. However, this was compensated for by 
higher density development: The average number of redeveloped flats per district 
between 2005 and 2017 turned out to be 949 units, 76.4 percent more than the 
figure for the 1972– 2004 period.
In Seoul, until the late 1990s, planning regulations on building density con-
trol were relaxed several times to allow for high- density development (Lee and 
Bae, 1998: 268). Between 1983 and 1990, the maximum FAR in general resi-
dential areas was 250 percent for north Seoul and 300 percent for south Seoul 
(Seoul Building Ordinance No. 1766, issued May 4, 1983). From November 
1990, it was increased to 400  percent (Seoul Building Ordinance No. 2660, 
issued November 9, 1990)  before decreasing to 300  percent in 1998 (Seoul 
Building Ordinance No. 3499, issued April 30, 1998). This high- density 
development enabled vertical accumulation (Shin, 2011), leading to a signifi-
cant increase in the number of both dwellings and residents in, for example, 
redeveloped neighborhoods. According to the Housing Redevelopment Bureau 





















1972~2004 547 294,166 18,942 6.4% 228,707 77.7% 46,517 15.8% 538
2005– 2017 972 922,535 411,758 44.6% 410,452 44.5% 100,325 10.9% 949
Source: MOLIT Statistics System. URL: http:// stat.molit.go.kr/ 
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of the Seoul Municipal Government, 65 redevelopment districts, which were 
completed between 1990 and 1996, experienced a 32 percent average increase 
in households and a 303  percent increase in the number of dwellings (Seoul 
Municipal Government, 1998: 32). The data from the Housing Division of the 
Seoul Municipal Government also shows that, by the end of 2010, the total 
number of new dwellings constructed in 211 redevelopment project sites reached 
206,145, replacing 79,935 units that became subject to demolition. As the size of 
the redeveloped flats was much larger than the dwellings they replaced, the overall 
increase in building volume would have been much larger than the increase in the 
number of dwellings.
A major outcome of such densification has been the rise of condominiums 
or apartments as a popular form of residence, transforming Korea into “the 
republic of apartment” (Gelézeau, 2007).7 By 2005, the majority (52.7 per-
cent) of dwellings in Korea turned out to be apartments, and the latest 2018 
Census results (Statistics Korea, 2019) reveal that apartments accounted 
for 61.4 percent of all dwellings. In Seoul, 58 percent of all dwellings were 
apartments, slightly lower than the national average, largely due to the presence 
of multi- household units. In Korea as a whole, of all the construction permits 
received from the central government between 1977 and 1981, apartments 
constituted 36.3 percent (Korea Land and Housing Corporation, 2016: 236– 
237); between 1982 and 1986, this rate increased to 51.9 percent. From 1992 
to 1996, 99.1 percent of all housing construction permits from the central gov-
ernment were apartments (ibid.).
Displacement and dispossession
One of the problems of property- based urban development in Korea is the pro-
liferation of large- scale displacement of original land users by incoming new users 
who are financially more affluent. When the Seoul Municipal Government turned 
its inner- city districts into a new central business district, it cleared the site of poor 
urban dwellers living in shanty units, driving them away to urban peripheries 
(Kim, 2010). It is suggested that, during the 14 years between 1958 and 1972, 
the Seoul Municipal Government displaced to urban peripheries about 300,000 
residents (about 17  percent of the municipal population in 1958)  housed in 
48,718 substandard dwellings (Jeong, 1984, cited in Jang, 1998: 27).
When the commercial redevelopment of substandard neighborhoods began 
in the early 1980s, the process also entailed the displacement of poor owner- 
occupiers and most tenants. A field report from the Asian Coalition for Housing 
Rights suggested that, during the six years of implementing redevelopment 
projects in Seoul between 1983 and 1988, about 720,000 people were subject 
to eviction (Asian Coalition for Housing Rights, 1989a, 1989b). A report from a 
municipal think tank (Kim et al., 1996) examined urban redevelopment projects 
of the mid- 1990s (1993– 1996) and estimated that more than four- fifths of 
tenants were displaced. In the case of housing sites developed by the Korea Land 
Corporation and based on the Housing Site Development Promotion Act, land 
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users other than landlords were largely driven away from what was constructed 
at the end of each project. This was because landlords were considered the only 
legitimate stakeholders under the governing law, thereby allowing them to avoid 
physical displacement.
While poor tenants and owner- occupiers were subject to direct physical dis-
placement from their homes and neighborhoods, another major problem was 
the loss of affordable dwellings or what Peter Marcuse (1985) referred to as 
“exclusionary displacement”. By the end of 2010, as noted above, urban redevel-
opment projects led to the demolition of 79,935 units— or 8.3 percent of total 
available housing stocks in 1980, when property- based urban redevelopment was 
being conceptualized to eradicate substandard neighborhoods.8 This represented 
a significant loss of affordable housing for low- income populations in Seoul in 
general— that is, their “exclusionary displacement”.
To the extent that gentrification can be understood as a class remaking of 
urban space at the expense of the original land users’ right to stay put (Lees, 
Shin and López- Morales, 2016), urban development in Korea can be seen as the 
burgeoning of new- build gentrification, which is deeply embedded in the pol-
itical economy of Korea’s speculative urbanization (Shin and Kim, 2016). The 
continuous efforts by the Korean developmental state, in alliance with developers, 
builders and aspirational middle- class investors, to transform the urban- scape 
of Seoul to become more global and presentable to the world drove the urban 
poor away from the city center to the urban peripheries, rendering them less vis-
ible and dispossessing them of the right to stay put and sustain their livelihoods 
(Kim, 2010). Even though the role of property owners was pivotal in Korea’s 
housing site development and urban redevelopment, poor property owners were 
constantly subject to cooptation as well as replacement by affluent investors in 
urban redevelopment projects (Ha, 2001; Shin and Kim, 2016). Tenants in par-
ticular were subject to much harsher treatment, having no right to stay put nor 
to demand compensation throughout the 1980s. Although they were entitled to 
relocate to public rental housing from the 1990s, tenants did not have a say in 
any kind of consultation or planning process. In other words, their rights were 
dispossessed.
The role of the developmental state and the construction of 
property hegemony
As noted previously, land and housing development in Korea until the late 1970s 
involved a private sector that was too weak to pursue large- scale market- led 
housing construction, although some builders experimented with the provision 
of condominium units as new commodities for the emergent middle classes (Sonn 
and Shin, 2020). Real estate investment received less emphasis in comparison 
with other investments in production facilities and non- residential construc-
tion in times of rapid economic development and condensed urbanization. Only 
from the mid- 1980s did the real estate sector experience a substantial increase 
in investment when the central government announced an ambitious scheme in 
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1980 to supply 5 million dwellings. Another push from the state came in 1988 
when the central government publicized its plan to construct 2 million housing 
units, which was part of the state’s effort to restore its legitimacy after having 
been challenged by the explosive democratization and labor movements (Lee, 
2007). The construction of new towns, extensive housing site development, use 
of state agencies (e.g., the Korea Land Corporation for land development and the 
KNHC for social housing construction) and the growth of private builders were 
all part of this big push to scale- up housing construction.
Rather than the direct provision of housing for the social reproduction of 
labor, the Korean developmental state was supporting property owners to take 
the lead in the process of urban development so that the state could continue to 
earmark available financial resources to support industrial production (Holliday, 
2000). Such approaches were consistent with the developmental state’s focus 
on subsidizing the growing conglomerates (chaebols) as capitalists, which were 
nurtured by the state throughout the 1960s and 1970s to expand industrial pro-
duction capacity (Park, 1998). Urban poor tenants were largely absent in the 
state’s considerations, while emergent middle- class families utilized their growing 
purchasing power to tap into the new markets in high- rise condominiums, often 
with speculative intent, a behavior which began to spring up across Seoul and 
eventually in other major cities (Shin and Kim, 2016; Yang, 2018).
The involvement of the subsidiaries of large conglomerates (chaebols) as 
financiers and builders in urban development has been particularly important— 
indeed, indispensable— to the success of land and housing development in Korea 
(La Grange and Jung, 2004). Large- scale land development and housing redevel-
opment projects required long- term commitment resulting from the frequent 
prolonging of land assembly and disputes between developers and property 
owners, while heavy upfront costs were to be spent on site preparation, compensa-
tion and actual construction (Ha, 2001). As a result, top- ranking private builders, 
which were subsidiaries of chaebols, were involved and became increasingly influ-
ential in urban (re)development projects, gaining a kind of brand name (e.g., 
apartment complexes named after conglomerates, such as Hyundai Apartments or 
Samsung Apartments). To support private builders and house buyers, the Korean 
developmental state also established the National Housing Fund (NHF) in July 
1981, which provided financial support for homebuyers and builders in the public 
and private sectors (Ha, 1987: 107– 109). Its main sources included the central 
government budgetary contribution and the National Housing Bonds (Ministry 
of Construction and Transportation of Korea, 2002: 232). Below- market rate 
interest loans from the NHF were provided to builders when constructing flats 
with a floor space of less than 85 square meters (ibid.: 272). The NHF was also 
the major source for supplementing funding shortages when the redevelopment 
project funds and land sale revenues were insufficient to finance the purchase 
of public rental flats in redevelopment projects (Kim et  al., 1995; Ministry of 
Construction and Transportation of Korea, 2002: 227).
To further help builders and property owners financially, off- plan purchasing 
was widely practiced. This system was first introduced by the Ordinance on 
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Housing Supply in 1977 in order to encourage housing construction in general; 
it also became a powerful tool for urban redevelopment and the mass construc-
tion of housing. Under this system, builders were permitted to sell their flats at 
an early stage of a project, usually when a project reached 10 or 20 percent of the 
project schedule. The down payment and period instalment from homebuyers 
assisted builders with the remaining work. The final instalment was made upon 
the homebuyers moving in (Yoon, 1994: 70– 72). For a redevelopment project, it 
was found that about one- third of the total project costs were spent by builders 
before they began to receive down payments through the off- plan purchase 
system (Korea Housing Institute, 2001: 56– 57; Lee and Bae, 1998: 277– 279).
While the Korean developmental state is conventionally characterized by its 
bureaucratic efficiency and the dedication of its civil servants to the develop-
mental ethos (Woo- Cumings, 1999), it is important to note that the Korean 
developmental state has promoted the hegemonic ideology of modernism and 
nation- building vis- à- vis the real and constructed threat from North Korea, which 
was mobilized as a means to produce nationwide consensus for the domination 
of political and economic elites. At the same time, the state resorted to the 
use of violent and brutal oppression of any resistance that challenged its legit-
imacy:  Notable examples include the so- called Yushin Reform and a series of 
presidential decrees known as Emergency Measures (Shin, 2018). Such brutal 
oppression underlay Korea’s property- based urban development (Korea Center 
for City and Environment Research, 1998).
With the rise of the commercial redevelopment of substandard settlements, 
many low- income tenants staged protests against redevelopment that provided 
them with no compensation upon displacement (ibid.). In the end, the Korean 
developmental state introduced concessions to eligible tenants in the form of 
public rental units for their re- housing (Ha, 2001; Kim, 2010). Various finan-
cial and administrative measures were put in place to both placate the dissenting 
tenants and ease the pressure on the growth coalition (inclusive of property 
owners, builders, and the municipal government) that often faced delayed 
schedules and increased costs.9
Throughout the history of urban (social) movements centered on housing 
justice (ibid.), the focus has largely been on improving the redistributive mech-
anism in order for a larger share of the appropriated rents, in the form of 
increased compensation, to be given to the urban poor who faced displacement 
and increased costs of living in the form of “forced consumption” (Shin, 2008). 
While such an approach of redistributive justice may have an advantage in ameli-
orating the hardships that displaced poor people have to endure, it does not 
change the unjust system itself (see Harvey, 2008; Marcuse, 2009). The intro-
duction of redevelopment compensation, for instance, justified the persistence of 
property- based urban redevelopment that continued to produce exclusionary dis-
placement for the urban poor who were squeezed into fewer affordable housing 
stocks, often ending up paying higher rents. The growth of public rental housing 
stocks from the early 1990s was helpful but inadequate:  By 2015, the public 
rental housing sector constituted 11.8  percent of national housing stocks (or 
Urban transformation “Korean style” 71
15.6 percent of all housing stocks in Seoul), but the share of public housing units 
with guaranteed rental periods of 20 years or more turned out to be only 5.4 per-
cent over the entire country and 7.0 percent in Seoul (Korea Land and Housing 
Corporation, 2016).
The hegemonic position of real estate property was strengthened throughout 
the 1980s and especially during the 2000s, when real estate prices underwent 
a rapid increase, negatively affecting not only middle- class families but also the 
working poor who aspired to the accumulation of property assets (Park and 
Jang, 2016). The fact that Korean households generally depended heavily on 
real estate properties for household finance highlights the importance of prop-
erty in the everyday life of Korean people of all generations. According to the 
results of the household finance survey conducted by Statistics Korea in 2016, 
property assets account for 69.2 percent of household assets (see Jin and Kim, 
2017:  403). Rapid increases in housing prices further helped consolidate this 
property hegemony: As demonstrated in Figure 4.1, based on the purchase price 
composite index between 1999 and 2019, housing in Seoul has experienced a 
164.6 percent increase on average, which is much higher than the national average 
of 110.1 percent. Within Seoul, the rate of increase was steeper in southern Seoul 
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Figure 4.1  Housing Purchase Price Composite Indices (each year index is based on January 
2019 = 100.0).
Source: Kookmin Bank web site. URL: https:// onland.kbstar.com
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overall trend of long- term increase in housing prices during the past decades 
is evident, suggesting that investors in housing would be unlikely to lose their 
money on a long- term basis. This guarantee of returns on real estate investment 
sustains property hegemony in Korea and conditions its contemporary urban pol-
itics (Shin, 2018).
Conclusion
The urban transformation in Korea during the economic take- off under the 
Korean developmental state benefited from the proliferation of the property- 
based urban development model, which was deeply embedded in the specific 
spatiotemporal contexts that accompanied particular sets of state- society and state- 
capital relations. In essence, property- based urban development, characterized 
by its speculative nature and verticality, is effectively a rent gap- based revenue- 
sharing model. Unfortunately, the lessons from Korea entailed adverse impacts 
on extant land users (especially poor owner- occupiers and tenants), who incurred 
direct physical displacement because they were not part of the policy design and 
could hardly make financial contributions. Exclusionary displacement through 
the loss of affordable housing stocks was another detrimental consequence for 
the urban poor. The Korean urban development experience could therefore be 
equated with exacerbated social injustice as the developmental gains were dispro-
portionately redistributed in favor of more affluent house buyers and builders. 
Land- based revenues through rent gap closure and any profits resulting from 
commercial development of land and housing largely went into the pockets of 
developers and homebuyers, including speculative investors, while the improved 
public facilities provided in redevelopment neighborhoods and new towns were 
consumed by the new users rather than previous users. In other words, urbaniza-
tion through gentrification has become a de facto state project in Korea (Shin and 
Kim, 2016; Lees, Shin and López- Morales, 2016).
The role of the developmental state has been influential. In addition to nurt-
uring the growth of industrial capital, it has used its planning power— such as 
land expropriation— to develop land in a speedy way; moreover, densification 
through granting a high FAR has created opportunities for the state to attract 
private builders and prospective real estate buyers, which has helped sustain 
property- based urban development projects. In the case of projects governed 
by the Housing Site Development Promotion Act, the involvement of a state 
agency, the Korea Land Corporation, was key to fast- tracking planning processes 
for land assembly as well as clearing barriers to private builders by taking care of 
possible disputes with landlords in the process of land expropriation, which was 
presented as development for public purpose under the law despite its unequal 
nature in practice. The authoritarian developmental state initially resorted to 
the use of state power and oppression to realize the urban development that 
accompanied widespread displacement and dispossession of extant land users. 
Eventually, however, the state resorted to the emerging hegemony of property to 
sustain property- based urban development.
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What can be learned from urban transformation “Korean style” for cities in 
the Global South? First, from the public finance perspective, the use of land- 
based revenues through rent gap closure can be a remedy for financially weak 
governments in the Global South— although appropriate measures are needed for 
the prevention of displacement of people and the dispossession of the rights of the 
property- less. Institutional infrastructure, such as the National Housing Fund, can 
be helpful in enabling the pooling of resources, thereby easing the fiscal burden on 
the national state and local states. The use of state corporations, such as the Korea 
Land Corporation, can also be effective. However, whether or not such utilization 
of institutional infrastructure serves the purpose of constructing “the just city” 
(cf. Fainstein, 2011) would depend on how much progressive movements exert 
pressure on the state and capital (Harvey, 2008; Marcuse, 2009).
Second, the expanding private sector throughout the 1970s and 1980s helped 
the consolidation of the property- based urban development model by partici-
pating in speculative real estate markets as builders and financiers, embodying 
the property hegemonic ideology. Such private sector players included the sub-
sidiaries of large conglomerates that had been nurtured by the Korean develop-
mental state; it also included middle- class families, whose increasing affluence 
helped finance the growth of the real estate market by consuming housing units 
en masse. The involvement of private builders as de facto developers in redevel-
opment projects was, to some extent, beneficial for the completion of projects 
by utilizing their expertise on project management and construction; however, it 
also raises questions about the equitable outcome of such development due to its 
profit- oriented nature. Capping the maximum share of profits to be enjoyed by 
private builders may be necessary in order for development gains to be retained 
for public use (Helbrecht and Weber- Newth, 2018).
Third, urban development “Korean style” has been possible under spatially 
and temporally bound conditions of social and economic development, which 
are situated in “distinctive historical conjunctures” (Roy, 2016:  317). These 
conditions are hard to replicate elsewhere, including the Global South, rendering 
the success of transferring a development model questionable. This is a senti-
ment shared by Beng Huat Chua (2011) in his discussion of the worlding of the 
Singapore model. While the role of the Korean developmental state has been 
influential, there is a need to understand the state from a relational perspective, 
acknowledging the growth coalition between the state and large conglomerates 
(Park, 1998) and between the state and the emergent middle class. It was not the 
autonomous and efficient state that made urban transformation possible; rather, 
it was the state working through relational politics as it aimed at sustaining its 
power in the face of challenges from the democratization movement and labor 
movements. The state also worked with industrial capital during the Cold War 
era to benefit from geopolitical tensions: One recent finding has been the ways in 
which the Vietnam War provided opportunities for conglomerates to expand (see 
Glassman and Choi, 2014). Without these national and geopolitical conditions, 
the state would not have been able to pursue the development of new housing 
markets through mass housing construction that depended heavily on inputs 
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from conglomerates and middle- class buyers. The rise of property hegemony also 
lured the working class and the poor with aspirations to join the so- called “prop-
ertied class” (Son, 2008), thereby endorsing the urban policies of the devel-
opmental state, which were unjust and unequal, even though absolute housing 
poverty itself had eased.
Fourth, property- based urban development in Korea has resulted in, and 
benefited from, uneven development that intensified regional disparity and socio-
economic inequality. Unequal distributions of property wealth have been a major 
problem marring the flourishing of society. They have been a constant source of 
dispute, despair, and frustration among families, especially those on the lower end 
of the income distribution. In this way, they also constitute a political agenda. 
Geographically, major metropolitan areas saw a concentration of investment in 
real estate, while small cities and counties saw weak demand for such invest-
ment. The experience of speculative urbanization that was manifested in Seoul 
has spread to other regional cities, replicating vertical accumulation even in more 
rural areas that would not usually expect a high demand for housing.
Therefore, a final lesson from Korean urban development is that, while 
acknowledging the need to strengthen public sector finance and to make use 
of land as an asset to finance urbanization, it is also necessary to ensure that 
appropriated rents are used for investment in “social infrastructure” to build an 
inclusive society and reduce inequality. Here, social infrastructure may refer to the 
provision of social facilities and communal spaces, such as health and educational 
facilities (e.g., medical centers, libraries), cultural amenities, social housing, green 
spaces, community facilities and networks, and so on, which would help the social 
reproduction of labor and family life. For Latham and Layton (2019: 9), social 
infrastructure enables people to “socialise and connect with others”, promoting 
“shared use and collective experience”.10 In Korea, it was the Asian financial crisis 
of the late 1990s that drove the Korean developmental state to pay more attention 
to the provision of a social safety net so that there is a minimum provision of 
social infrastructure to sustain livelihoods. Nevertheless, there is still a prepon-
derance of speculative fervor and the widening asset inequality that undermines 
the construction of an inclusive and just society. Therefore, more attention ought 
to be paid to the accumulation of social infrastructure as well as ensuring that 
the market is regulated to prevent the negative consequences of property- based 
urban development and its propensity to speculation through exploitation of the 
“property- less”. In the long term, there has been a call to acknowledge the city 
as an “urban commonwealth” (Kohn, 2016), where the wealth created in the 
course of development is controlled by the public as a collective asset to be spent 
according to need rather than for the sake of accumulation.
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Notes
 1 Methodological nationalism treats the scale of the nation- state as the exclusive unit of 
analysis for explaining social phenomena, thereby neglecting the importance of multi- 
scalar politics that are inclusive of local scales as well as transnational scales. Daniel 
Chernilo (2006: 129) further states that “[m] ethological nationalism presupposes that 
the nation- state is the natural and necessary form of society in modernity and that the 
nation- state becomes the organising principle around which the whole project of mod-
ernity cohered”.
 2 The “clearance and redevelopment” scheme under the 1973 Temporary Act consisted 
of two different approaches. The first approach was often referred to as “self- help 
clearance and redevelopment” and was applied between 1973 and 1975 (Kim et al. 
1996: 87). Land was to be redefined into larger housing lots (usually at least 165 square 
meters) so that shared ownership among several households would make it easier to 
build “corporative housing” of higher density. The dwelling owners were required to 
finance all the costs incurred for the purchase of public lands they illegally occupied, for 
temporary accommodation until re- housing, and for the reconstruction of houses after 
clearance. The second approach that presented important implications for practices in 
the 1980s was known as “consigned redevelopment”. Owner- occupiers were to estab-
lish a steering committee and bring in a private builder in charge of removing dwellings 
and producing new apartment flats or multi- household units. The municipal govern-
ment was to supervise the process as well as nominate builders of good reputation. 
Twenty to 30 households were to come together so as to define approximately 1,000 
square meters of housing lot, thereby constructing dwellings with higher density (Kim 
et al. 1996: 96).
 3 According to the Master Plan for Housing Redevelopment in Seoul, finalized in 1998, 
the examination of more than 100 redevelopment project sites showed that about two- 
fifths of land turned out to be in public ownership and that the majority of houses in 
redevelopment sites were, in fact, illegal (Seoul Municipal Government 1998: 20– 21).
 4 The Urban Planning Act has been absorbed into the Act on Planning and Use of 
National Territory since January 1, 2003.
 5 Redevelopment projects are led by redevelopment associations made up of property 
owners as members. New flats produced as part of redevelopment consist of (a) flats 
allocated to members of the redevelopment association, who purchase these flats at 
construction cost; (b) flats for sale in the new housing market for profits; and (c) public 
housing units as required by local governments.
 6 Urban Redevelopment Project statistics are available at http:// stat.molit.go.kr/ (last 
accessed April 30, 2020).
 7 Apartments were perceived as a symbol of the modern lifestyle and received the 
attention of the state from the 1960s (see Sonn and Shin 2020: 872– 873).
 8 For the historic data on housing stocks, see the Seoul Research Data Service website on 
housing. Available at: http:// data.si.re.kr/ node/ 343 (last accessed April 30, 2020).
 9 In Seoul, in accordance with the Urban Redevelopment Act and the Municipal 
Ordinance on Urban Redevelopment, a certain proportion of urban planning tax 
income (5 percent until 1982 and 10 percent thereafter) was earmarked for a special 
municipal account for urban redevelopment. The fund accumulated in this way was 
called the “redevelopment project fund”, which was used by the government to pur-
chase public rental units provided in the redevelopment neighborhoods (Kim et al. 
1995). The sales revenue of public land in redevelopment districts was also earmarked 
for the purchase of these rental units.
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 10 One of the policy examples is the latest London Plan in the UK, which has a dedicated 
chapter on social infrastructure. Here, social infrastructure is understood as covering 
“a range of services and facilities that meet local and strategic needs and contribute 
towards a good quality of life. It includes health provision, education, community, 
play, youth, early years, recreation, sports, faith, criminal justice and emergency facil-
ities”, and plays “an important role in developing strong and inclusive communities” 
(Mayor of London, 2019: 240).
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